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Chase: Workmen's Compensation--Application to National Guardsman
RECENT CASE COMMENTS
the former. This doctrine has been applied where the money was
paid by the grantee to the grantor by way of a loan to a third
party, and the grantee of legal title was held a resulting trustee
for the third party.' The parol evidence to show the land was
bought for another was admitted to show the money was advanced
as a loan, thus overcoming the objection that such evidence is inadmissible to prove a parol trust. *Where B promised to convey
one-half interest in his land to C if C would pay one-half the
expenses in pending litigation to acquire the land, and C paid no
money, there was no resulting trust. The court held such a contract to be one for the sale of land within the statute of frauds.!
To raise a resulting trust it is necessary that C pay or assume a
binding obligation at or before the time of conveyance of legal
title to B. This requirement was not satisfied in the principal
case. A payment subsequent to conveyance will not attach a
trust.8 But a payment after the contract of sale is made, but
before conveyance, will raise a resulting trust.
-AUGUST

WORKMEN'S

COMPENSATION -

W. PETROPLUS.

APPLICATION

TO

NATIONAL

GUARDSMAN. - The North Carolina Supreme Court, in the case
of Baker v. State,. decided that a North Carolina National Guardsman was an employee of the state within the meaning of their
Workmen's Compensation Act.' The Act provides that the word
"employment" includes all employees of the state and that the
word "employee" means every person engaged in any employment
under any appointment or contract of hire or apprenticeship.
The plaintiff was injured while engaged upon his duties as
National Guardsman. He was a regularly enlisted member of
that organization, having signed an enlistment contract. He received fifty cents per week from the state for his services as a
militiaman. It was insisted that the plaintiff was not an employee of the state within the meaning of the act, since his status
5 Scott, Resulting Trusts Arising Upon the Purchase of Land (1927)
HARv. L. REv. 669.
6 McDonough v. O'Neill, 118 Mass. 92 (1873).
"Woods v. Ward, 48 W. Va. 652, 37 S. E. 520 (1900).
8
Currence v. Ward, 43 W. Va. 367, 27 S. E. 329 (1897).
9
Bright v. Knight, 35 W. Va. 40, 13 S. E. 63 (1891).

40

:'Baker v. State, 156 S. E. 917 (N. C. 1931).
2North Carolina Pub. Laws 1929, e. 120, § 2(a).
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was not contractual in that the relation of master and servant
was not established in accordance with recognized legal standards
The court thought that the relation of an employer and employee
may exist, as contemplated by the Compensation Act, otherwise
than in strict accordance with legal standard.' The state had
waived its sovereign rights and its exemption of liability and had
voluntarily become a self-insurer of its compensation liability.
The West Virginia Compensation Act provides that "All
persons in the service of the employers as herein defined and
employed by them for the purpose of carrying on the industry,
business or work in which they are engaged, are subject to this
Providing our state waived its immunity and the question
act"
arose as it did in the Baker case our court would hardly be faced
with the difficult problem of construction that confronted the
North Carolina Court. It would seem that our statute is more
favorable to the imposition of liability.
Perhaps sound policy may warrant the state's assumption of
this burden but circumstances might arise wherein this ordinarily
slight responsibility would assume great proportions. What if
the militia were called upon to quell a race riot and several
hundred were injured, was this situation within the contemplation
of the General Assembly when they considered this act? Ordinarily
a liberal construction of a Compensation Act seems desirable.'
The question here is so clearly one of policy that it is doubtful
whether it should be settled simply by way of the court so constiuing the statute as to fit the requirements. If the state were
buying compensation insurance and not insuring itself the decision in the principal case would pave the way to higher
premiums. Military risks should be covered but should it be on a
workmen's compensation basis?
-JOHN K. CHASE.
SSibley v. State, 89 Conn. 682, 96 Atl. 161 (1915); Hines v. Dept of
Labor and Industry, 150 Wash. 230, 272 Pac. 734 (1928).
1Supra n. 1.
;W. VA. REv. CODE (1931) e. 23, art. 2, § 1.
Johnson v. Hosiery Co., 199 N. C. 38, 153 S. E. 591 (1930) ; Sgathone v.
Mulholland, 290 Pa. 341, 138 Atl. 855 (1927); Carter v. Woods Bros Const.
Co., 120 Kan. 481, 244 Pac. 1 (1926); Smith v. Jones, 102 Conn. 471, 129

Atl. 50 (1925).
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